Published: January 19, 2026
MONROVIA — Senegal has kicked out Nigerian oil firm Oranto Petroleum from the Cayar Offshore Shallow (COS) block after years of inactivity and repeated failures to meet basic financial obligations, an extraordinary regulatory rebuke that is now colliding with a very different reality in Liberia, where lawmakers recently brushed aside fierce objections and ratified Oranto’s new Production Sharing Contracts for four offshore blocks.
Dakar is tightening its petroleum governance and reclaiming acreage from companies it says cannot deliver, while Monrovia has handed Oranto a fresh foothold in the Liberian Basin, despite longstanding controversy over the firm’s track record, legal compliance, and the terms of its deal.
Senegal’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, under Minister Birame Souleye Diop, formally withdrew Oranto’s COS license in September 2025 after multiple, unfulfilled demands for bank guarantees to support the work program under the contract. The block, awarded in 2008, saw little to no meaningful exploration, according to industry accounts referenced in early 2026 reports. The Senegalese government has since taken back control of the acreage, framing the decision as part of a broader shift toward stricter enforcement and a more rigorous screening of petroleum rights holders under President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s administration.
Senegal’s hard line
According to the account cited in the African Energy Chamber statement dated Jan. 13, the government said it acted after Oranto failed to provide financial guarantees required by the COS contract despite repeated formal requests. Those guarantees, Senegal argues, are not cosmetic paperwork—they are the backbone of confidence that a license holder can finance seismic work, appraisal, and drilling without dragging the state into years of dead acreage and stalled development.
The ministry’s assessment reportedly examined compliance with core obligations: financial capacity, execution of the work program, and respect for timelines. In Dakar’s view, failure to meet those obligations was enough to trigger the state’s right to revert the block under Senegal’s petroleum governance framework.
Oranto, a privately owned Nigerian oil and gas exploration firm owned by businessman Arthur Eze, has operated across Africa largely as an early-stage player, often securing acreage and seeking partners for expensive drilling and development phases. But the COS case reveals the political and economic limits of that model in jurisdictions now demanding proof of capability, not promises.
The COS block, north of the Dakar peninsula, is part of Senegal’s shallow-water portfolio. It is considered oil-prone and underexplored compared with deep offshore plays, with multiple identified leads.
Liberia’s opposite move
In Liberia, Oranto did not face cancellation or expulsion. It faced criticism, and got ratified anyway.
Late 2025 into December, the Liberian Legislature approved multiple major concession instruments, including Production Sharing Contracts involving Oranto Petroleum Liberia Limited and TotalEnergies, and a separate agreement involving Ivanhoe Atlantic Inc. Critics argued that the Oranto contract, in particular, was riddled with red flags: concerns about capacity, diluted financial terms, legal inconsistencies, and the risk of repeating Liberia’s painful history of speculative resource deals.
Still, despite weeks of pushback and public debate, the House of Representatives passed an omnibus instrument bundling the Oranto deal with the widely supported TotalEnergies agreement, an approach some lawmakers described as a tactic to secure passage for a controversial measure by attaching it to a popular one.
Nimba County Representative Musa Hassan Bility was among those who objected. He said he would have supported the TotalEnergies agreement if it had been brought separately, but opposed the combined vote because the Oranto component lacked justification and logic.
His core allegation was that Oranto has no clear exploration plan and operates on a model of acquiring blocks and flipping them for profit, rather than drilling, developing, and producing value inside the host country.
The Senate later concurred by a two-thirds majority. On the Oranto instrument, 20 senators voted in favor. A smaller bloc voted against, while others supported only TotalEnergies but were overruled by the majority.
Gbarpolu County Senator Amara Konneh, one of the most vocal critics, warned that ratifying Oranto sends a dangerous message to the global energy industry: that in Liberia, paper guarantees can substitute for proven technical performance.
“This decision tells the world that in Liberia, paper guarantees can substitute for proven technical performance in acquiring petroleum rights,” Konneh argued, noting that the government leaned on a financial guarantee from Atlas Petroleum to underwrite Oranto’s obligations.
Konneh also raised alarms about the signature bonus structure and exploration timeline. The agreement advertises a US$15 million signature bonus for four blocks, but only US$5 million is due within four months of ratification, with the remaining US$10 million tied to future milestones that could stretch payments across multiple years.
Even more controversial, Konneh asserted the agreement grants Oranto a 10-year exploration period, despite what he described as a statutory seven-year limit under Liberia’s Petroleum Law, with extensions contingent on strict work commitments.
Liberia’s resource trauma and distrust
Liberia’s history of natural resource concessions is littered with agreements that promised transformation but delivered frustration. From the Firestone concession signed in 1926, still one of the most debated foreign investment deals on the continent, to modern iron ore, logging, and agricultural concessions, the pattern critics cite is depressingly consistent: weak negotiation, limited transparency, poor enforcement, and unequal gains.
Former House Speaker Cllr. J. Fonati Koffa, also one of the loudest critics of the Oranto deal, framed it as part of a wider betrayal of Liberia’s laws and citizens.
In a widely discussed Facebook post, Koffa argued that the agreement violates the intent of Liberia’s 2019 Petroleum Law, which he says mandates direct citizen participation, 5% equity for Liberians in each block, with NOCAL holding 10% on behalf of the state.
Koffa’s allegation is that the Oranto agreement consolidates the full 15% equity under NOCAL, effectively sidelining citizens from direct ownership and turning the law’s promise into a paper headline.
“The Oranto agreement says NOCAL will get the 15% and Liberians should leave their own with gor,” Koffa wrote, using Liberian street language for being cheated or left behind.
His rhetorical question, “Is this weakness in negotiation, or is it wickedness?”, hit a nerve because it speaks to national insecurity: the fear that Liberia repeatedly signs away opportunity, then discovers the damage too late.
Performance vs. paperwork
Senegal said Oranto repeatedly failed to produce them. Under Dakar’s governance approach, that failure was enough to reclaim the block.
In Liberia, critics say the opposite is happening: guarantees and commitments are being structured in ways that soften enforcement and reward delay.
Konneh described the signature bonus as diluted, split into installments, and tied to milestones that can be postponed. He warned that accepting a multi-year payment plan for an upfront obligation weakens Liberia’s negotiating position and encourages speculative behavior.
This matters because Liberia’s offshore basin is still frontier territory: high-risk, high-cost exploration that demands technical competence and deep-pocketed partners. Countries that successfully commercialize oil and gas resources typically enforce strict timelines and financial proof so blocks do not become parked assets.
Oranto’s continental record
The Oranto controversy does not exist in a vacuum.
Opponents argue that across Africa, Oranto’s history includes long periods of inactivity, speculation, and reliance on partners rather than direct development. That critique, fair or harsh, now gains weight from Senegal’s decision to reclaim COS after it says Oranto failed to meet basic financial obligations for work commitments.
Liberia has its own history with Oranto. Critics point to earlier episodes in which the company held blocks but transferred them without drilling, creating the perception that Liberia’s basin can be treated as a tradable commodity rather than a development project.
Supporters of the new deal argue that Liberia needs fresh capital and exploration momentum, and that the government has structured obligations to attract investment while keeping state equity through NOCAL.
Liberia’s dilemma
The Boakai administration wants to revive a dormant petroleum sector. The Liberian Basin has been described for years as promising but underexplored, with high potential yet high uncertainty. The country needs new revenue streams, jobs, infrastructure, and a stronger fiscal base. Oil, in theory, can help.
But the public and political class are deeply allergic to exploitation. Many Liberians have heard too many promises from concessionaires and seen too few results.
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