Published: October 2, 2026
The ongoing intellectual debate ignited by President Joseph Boakai’s maxim “a brilliant lawyer knows the law, but a good lawyer knows the judge” has given the public a rare and fascinating window into the soul of legal philosophy.
Following heavy criticism from the eminent Cllr. Tiawan Saye Gongloe, Minister Cllr Jerror Cole Bangalu stepped into the breach to defend the President’s remarks. In a well-reasoned, highly articulate defence, Cllr. Bangalu argued that “knowing the judge” does not imply bribery or backroom deals. Rather, he framed it as the hallmark of a seasoned practitioner mastering a judge’s courtroom etiquette, tailoring arguments to their judicial temperament, and understanding their procedural peculiarities.
Alfred H. W. Brownell, Contributing Writer
His argument is a masterful piece of legal realism popularized by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who famously declared that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” To the realist, the law is not a math equation; it is a human institution run by human beings.
When viewed from that lens, He is entirely right about courtroom mechanics which includes understanding a judge’s temperament, scheduling habits, and procedural preferences is simply smart advocacy. It isn’t corruption; it’s pragmatism.
However, invoking the cornerstone of legal education in Lon L. Fuller’s 1949 masterpiece, the Case of the Speluncean Explorers reveals one core truth “the legitimacy of the law depends on the perception that judicial decisions arise from principle, not personal relationships” and that’s why Bangalu defence misses the philosophical mark and why we must journey into Fuller’s fictional cave to under the warning to future generations.
The Warning of the Speluncean Cave
In Fuller’s famous thought experiment, five trapped explorers face starvation and decided to cast lots to sacrifice one member so the others might survive. Upon their rescue, they are tried and convicted under a statute mandating death for anyone who “wilfully takes the life of another.” On appeal, five Supreme Court justices’ issue five entirely different opinions, representing the warring factions of jurisprudential thought.
When we view the Boakai-Bangalu doctrine that a good lawyer knows the judge through the lens of the Speluncean Explorers, the systemic gaps in their logic quickly begin to unravel.
Chief Justice Truepenny — The Voice of Institutional Integrity
Truepenny emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust in the judiciary. Even when he personally sympathizes with the defendants, he insists on applying the statute as written to preserve institutional legitimacy. His reasoning underscores why public statements implying personal judicial favouritism are harmful: they erode the very institutional trust Truepenny seeks to protect.
Justice Foster — Natural Law, but Still Principle-Based
Foster argues that strict legal positivism should yield moral reasoning. Yet even he insists that judicial authority must be exercised according to principled standards, not personal ties. President Boakai’s maxim suggests that personal familiarity enhances advocacy. Foster would reject any suggestion that personal relationships should influence judicial outcomes, even indirectly.
Justice Keen — The Strict Positivist and Guardian of Impartiality
Keen is uncompromising and demands judges must apply law “mechanically,” without regard to personal preference, sympathy, or social relationships. His opinion is the clearest jurisprudential rebuke to President Boakai’s statement. For Keen, the idea that “a good lawyer knows the judge” is anathema to judicial ethics. He would argue that such a maxim undermines the rule of law by implying that personal familiarity, not legal merit drives judicial outcomes.
Justice Handy — The Pragmatist Who Still Warns About Perception
Handy is the most flexible, willing to consider public opinion and practical realities. Yet even he acknowledges that judicial legitimacy collapses when decisions appear to be driven by personal connections. The truth is President Boakai’s statement aligns most closely with Handy’s realism, but Handy’s approach is precisely the one criticized for eroding judicial impartiality.
Justice Tatting — The Judge Who Withdraws to Protect Integrity
Tatting recuses himself because he cannot reconcile competing principles. His withdrawal demonstrates how seriously judges must take conflicts that threaten impartiality. His sensitivity to judicial integrity highlights why public statements implying personal judicial relationships are jurisprudentially reckless.
The Dangerous Implication of Realism
Cllr. Bangalu is entirely correct that, in practice, a lawyer who ignores a judge’s preference for brief formatting or oral conciseness does their client a disservice. But there is a vast, dangerous gulf between acknowledging this reality and elevating it to a presidential doctrine or joke for country that ranks 108th out of 143 countries globally on the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2025, with an overall score of 0.44.
When the highest office in the land declares that a “good” lawyer focuses on the judge while a “brilliant” one merely focuses on the law, it implicitly devalues the law itself and implicates article 65 of the Constitution, which vests judicial power in the courts and establishes their duty to apply the law independently.
Indirectly, it weakens the broader constitutional architecture including articles 3, 66, and 70 by signalling executive disregard for the supremacy of law, encouraging a culture where legal actors prioritize personalities over principles, and subtly normalizing interference with the judiciary. It sends a message to the public that the law is malleable, subjective, and secondary to the person wielding the gavel.
If justice shifts based on who is wearing the robe, then equal protection under the law becomes an illusion. The citizen who cannot afford a lawyer “who knows the judge” is instantly structurally disadvantaged, not because their representative legal argument is weak, but because they lack the right advocate to navigate the judge’s personal disposition. This is precisely the systemic injury that Cllr. Gongloe rightly warned against.
Cllr. Gongloe’s response echoed the natural‑law and positivist traditions: the idea that law must be applied impartially, and that lawyers must win cases through competence, not connections.
How the Centrism Movement Meeting Collides With “What Is the Law?”
President Boakai’s now‑famous remark “a brilliant lawyer knows the law, but a good lawyer knows the judge” lands with even sharper irony when placed against his meeting with the Centrism movement.
This contrast becomes even more striking when viewed through the lens of President Boakai’s political evolution. On July 18, 2023, when he met with the Centrism Movement in a moment that surprised the room even before the conversation could begin, he reportedly pulled his phone from his pocket, opened the classroom video, and showed the leaders and members of the Centrism movement a law professor asking students the foundational question every law student and citizen must confront: “What is the law?” The gesture was meant to spark reflection, where the professor presses his students to define law not as custom, not as convenience, and certainly not as personal access, but as a principled system of rules that commands legitimacy. That moment now sits in sharp contrast with President Boakai’s remark at the United Nations General Assembly meeting that “a good lawyer knows the judge.”
When placed beside the professor’s question “What is the law?” President Boakai’s remark inadvertently drifts away from the leadership style built on balance, pragmatism, and consensus to the idea that judicial outcomes hinge on relationships and informal influence. The video, by contrast, stands as a quiet corrective measure, reminding us that the legitimacy of any justice system depends not on knowing the judge, but on knowing the law and trusting that the law, not proximity, decides cases.
The Higher Standard As Officers Of The Court
A practicing Attorney must be a realist to survive in the courtroom. They must know the terrain. But a President, as the custodian of the constitutional order, must be an idealist.
Leadership should champion an environment where the law is supreme, blind, and entirely predictable regardless of whether the Attorney in front of the bench is a seasoned veteran or a nervous novice fresh out of law school. We should strive for a judiciary where “knowing the law” is more than enough to secure justice.
President Boakai’s statement may have been rhetorical or humorous. But jurisprudence teaches us that language about judges must be handled with precision.
Bangalu’s defence focuses on professional practice. Jurisprudence focuses on public trust.
And when viewed through the lens of the five Speluncean judges, President Boakai’s maxim however well‑intended leans too close to the idea that judicial outcomes depend on personal relationships.
In law, perception shapes legitimacy. And legitimacy is the lifeblood of justice.
By treating the legal system as a psychological game of chess rather than a monument to objective justice, the “knowing the judge” doctrine leaves us trapped in the dark of the Speluncean cave, chasing the whims of men rather than the certainty of the law.
If we want a nation where foreign investors trust our markets, where citizens trust the police, and where the vulnerable feel protected, we must build a system where knowing the law is completely, unassailably enough. Reform does not begin with new concrete courthouses; it begins when our leaders openly champion a blind, predictable, and fair system of justice, establishing it as the absolute minimum standard for the Republic.
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