MONROVIA – Liberian leaders have long grappled with the challenge of balancing relations with Washington, a task no president has managed without significant compromise or consequences since the nation’s founding. This balancing act has been particularly pronounced during the Second Republic, from William R. Tolbert’s “Mat to Mattress” policy to Charles G. Taylor’s “VISION 2024.” The outcomes have invariably shaped both the presidency and the stability of Liberia, often with far-reaching consequences. A clear-eyed analysis of these interactions points to an undeniable truth: the complex and asymmetric interdependence between Liberia and Washington necessitates a re-evaluation and the formation of a new engagement strategy, as severing ties is not feasible.
Joseph Boakai is not the first president to show signs of fatigue or seek alliances with nations that compete with Washington economically and geopolitically. China and Russia, along with the former USSR, have historically been quick to exploit any strain in Liberia-Washington relations. Presidents like Tolbert, Samuel K. Doe, and Taylor followed similar paths, each with disastrous outcomes. Recent reports suggest Boakai perceives a lack of substantial support from Washington, prompting a gradual pivot towards China—a move considered perilous by those familiar with the history of U.S.-Liberia relations. Insight into these dynamics can be gleaned from pages 243–247 of the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report.
Historically, the United States has wielded significant influence over Liberia’s economic, military, and geopolitical strategies. Key sectors such as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), National Security Agency (NSA), maritime registry, and extractive industries have been heavily influenced by this relationship. For instance, the establishment of Firestone in Liberia in 1926 was a strategic move by Washington to counter Great Britain’s potential monopoly on rubber production. Infrastructural projects like the Omega tower and Roberts International Airport were also driven by U.S. military interests in securing a strategic presence in Africa.
Unlike Boakai, William R. Tolbert governed a nation with stronger economic fundamentals. He advocated for self-reliance, particularly in food production, and championed African unity and resistance against neo-colonialism. His policies, reflecting these values, provoked Washington, ultimately contributing to the 1979 rice riots and the subsequent 1980 coup. Tolbert’s reevaluation of policies aimed at improving the populace’s living conditions was perceived as a threat by external powers.
Both Doe and Taylor, who came to power through military means, eventually met similar fates. Doe’s rule was characterized by poor foresight and divisive tribal politics, while Taylor, who emulated Tolbert’s style, openly resisted directives from Washington. His nonconformist stance and failure to develop a viable independent foreign policy marked him for downfall.
Now, Boakai faces similar challenges. His predecessors, Weah and Sirleaf, managed to avoid direct confrontations with Washington, despite some of Weah’s officials being sanctioned over controversial deals with companies like High-Power Exploration (HPX), backed by Washington. Boakai’s reported negotiations with companies like Huawei and SUMEC Technology, which are blacklisted by the U.S., suggest a defiance that could justify punitive actions from Washington.
Navigating this intricate relationship demands a delicate balance between cooperation and independence. Over-reliance on Washington risks significant compromise, while distancing too much could lead to diplomatic, political, and economic repercussions. The unpredictability of this relationship, swinging between support and pressure based on geopolitical interests, presents a key challenge for Liberian leaders.
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